Unfortunately, as can happen when there is failure to distinguish between method and the way it is applied, the promise that cost-benefit analysis holds for juvenile justice is sometimes undermined by exaggeration of its usefulness. Some zealous advocates view the procedure as a logical, rigorous technique that supplies definitive answers to policy questions. Adopt the action that maximizes benefits while minimizing costs, they say, and all will be well. 4 But cost-benefit analysis cannot produce unequivocal answers. Especially in domains such as juvenile justice where it is hard to quantify, monetize, or even identify many important benefits and costs (e.g., pain and suffering of victims and offenders), the procedure yields findings that are too uncertain to serve as exclusive policy guides. One source of uncertainty, common to all forms of social analysis, is the already-noted scarcity of suitable data on which to base robust estimates of policy effects. Most studies in the justice field, as a result, invent hypothetical scenarios and then suggest what cost-benefit relationships "might" look like under them. 5 Another source, as DiIulio and Piehl (1991) note, is imprecision in assigning money values. There is wide variation in dollar estimates for tangible costs and benefits, i.e., items that have market prices, and intangible costs and benefits, i.e., items that don't have these prices. Especially awkward, because estimates can vary by a factor of two thousand or more, are dollar values of such things as lives saved or lost, pain and suffering incurred or avoided, and quality of life heightened or diminished. 6 A third source of uncertainty is analytical bias. Cost-benefit analysis is a subjective operation that always adopts a particular point of view: that of society as a whole viewed through the lens of economic theory, which after Gittinger (1982) we call "economic" analysis; or those of individuals and organizations within it, "financial" analysis. 7 For any perspective, analysts have wide latitude to decide which costs and which benefits they include, to determine which of these costs and benefits are assigned monetary values, and to choose among several methods of estimating the values. In their turn, decision makers and other consumers of studies have scope to argue that findings of costbenefit analysis at odds with their opinions are caused by incorrect dollar estimates, inappropriate inclusion or exclusion of certain costs and benefits, or some other source of prejudice.
Taken together, these uncertainties make it hard for cost-benefit analysis to provide unambiguous answers about whether benefits are sufficient in relation to costs. Difficulty, however, should in no way suggest that the method is useless -among other sensible reasons because the alternative to ambiguous answers is, simply, no answers. Absent answers, deliberations on the merits of policy are condemned to continue to turn mainly on preferences shaped by congeniality, ideology, and political expediency of the moment; quality of rhetoric brought to bear on arguments; and other enigmatic influences. In other words, although cost-benefit analysis yields uncertain answers, incorporating them into the decision making process helps to narrow the much greater, incessant uncertainty that confounds juvenile justice. Even if the method can't supply "the" answers, it can help a lot, as the following tries to demonstrate.
Patterns of Re-offense and Re-disposition
Most young people referred to the Dallas County Juvenile Department are subject to two informal and five formal dispositions that impose increasingly tighter limits on freedom of action. 8 Under the state's juvenile code, the department applies milder sanctions on children having few and/or relatively minor infractions and progressively harsher sanctions on those with many repeated and/or serious infractions. 9 Each step in the disposition sequence demands greater expenditure by the county and state. Main benefits expected from these extra outlays, depending on point of view, are additional gains in child maturation (manifesting themselves, for instance, as immediate or longerterm improvements in employment, earnings, health, civic participation, school attendance, academic grades, etc.), greater offender suffering, more offenses prevented, or a combination of these.
We do not have reliable measures for behavioral progress or for distress. Our analysis, necessarily partial, therefore focuses on a relatively narrow question: What are the likely effects, first in terms of differences in numbers of re-offenses and associated re-dispositions and then in terms of differences in money values, of expending extra resources on harsher sanction? Specifically we ask: What would happen if juvenile offenders get regular probation rather than deferred prosecution, intensive supervision probation instead of regular probation, local placement rather than intensive supervision probation, and TYC rather than local placement? 10 Data to answer the question about numbers come from the records of 13,144 individuals referred to the department during 1994-97. They committed 58,650 juvenile and adult infractions and received 17,124 dispositions between their first referral and the end of 1999 (Table 1) .
11 Each of our observations is an initial disposition event that ranges from the mildest sanction, deferred prosecution, to the harshest, TYC placement.
12 Although data allow tracking for up to five years of followup, 1994-99, sample size in the fifth year is too small to produce meaningful results. Accordingly, our analysis tracks four years (though most tables show three because there are no statistically significant differences in year four). To estimate effects of substituting one disposition for another, we apply to these data a negative binomial regression procedure that controls for the influences on re-offense and re-disposition patterns of race and ethnicity, sex, age at first referral and at disposition, number and type of prior referrals, and number and type of prior adjudications.
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The exercise yields an estimate of the probable range of differences in numbers of re-offenses and re-dispositions for each disposition pair and followup year. Table 2 shows the results for re-offenses. 15 It suggests that changing the sentence of 100 juveniles from deferred prosecution to probation would produce an estimated increase of 20.9 technical violation and status re-offenses in the first year, with a 95% probability that the true figure lies between 17.1 and 24.9, and 1.5 such re-offenses in the second year (in a range of 0.0 to 3.7). There are no differences in years three (or four). These increases stem from the combination of scrutiny that offenders receive from probation officers and imposition of court orders that they must follow. Juveniles do not necessarily behave differently under probation than under deferred prosecution. It is just that their misbehavior is spotted. However, as a result of being picked up for technical violations and status re-offenses in the first two years, the number of misdemeanors declines by 5.4 offenses in the first year (in range of 2.2 to 8.5), and 3.6 in the second (0.1 to 6.9). For felonies, significant in the third year only, the model predicts a mid-range increase of 3.9 offenses. Additional monitoring imposed by substituting intensive supervision for regular probation yields a single result, a mid-range rise of 11.7 technical violation and status re-offenses in the first year. Broader impacts appear only with the offense suppression effects of incarceration, as when local placement replaces intensive supervision. Here there are large mid-range declines in technical violations (31.8), misdemeanors (16.4), and felonies (15.2) in the first year. These are followed by increases: 6.5 felonies in year two, 14.4 misdemeanors and 6.7 felonies in year three. Similarly, when TYC substitutes for local placement, significant drops in numbers of violations show up in all years, misdemeanors during the first and third years, and felonies during the first year.
The overall effect is summarized in the right-most column of Table 2 , which shows mid-range values for the net number of all re-offenses. Probation in lieu of deferred prosecution engenders a net rise of 15.5 re-offenses in year one, a drop of 2.1 in year two, and a rise of 3.9 in year three, or a total net increase of 17.3 offenses for the whole period. Local placement in lieu of intensive supervision, likewise, produces a total net decline of 35.8 offenses, TYC in lieu of local placement a decline of 63.3.
These differences result from and run together with differences in re-dispositions, which we show for mid-range values in Table 3 . Numbers are necessarily less in this case because many re-offenses are not serious enough to warrant prosecution and because re-dispositions often follow a string of infractions rather than every one. 16 Our re-disposition models thus consist of five equations. Two are for first and second year re-dispositions in the juvenile system, with a third equation capturing a time-lag effect in our data of large numbers of first-year offenses adjudicated during the second year. We do not apply these equations to juvenile data for the third and fourth years because results are statistically insignificant. For these years we apply two equations to the sub-sample of adult data. Further, because the re-disposition models use only cases that have at least one re-offense during the followup period, resulting in a smaller number of valid cases, we impose another restriction. Instead of predicting re-dispositions for each offense class, feasible only for first and second year juvenile data, our estimates for years three and four predict re-dispositions for all offenses. Reflecting the juvenile code's emphasis on accountability, the table underscores that most re-dispositions are severe. In the first and second years, roughly 60% of all re-dispositions for the probation cohort are local and TYC placements. Proportions rise progressively toward 100% for the other cohorts. For adults, likewise, jail or prison is the dominant sentence in 70% or more of cases. This severity of sanction, combined with differences in the sequence of re-dispositions that follow different initial dispositions, helps to explain the re-offense patterns described earlier. Probation, for example, because it involves closer supervision, detects more re-offenses than deferred prosecution.
This accounts for the increase in numbers of technical and status offenses in the first year, and in the second year to a lesser extent, when probation substitutes for deferred prosecution.
When juveniles on probation re-offend again, most are placed in local or TYC facilities for extended periods, constraining their ability to re-offend during these periods. However, when juveniles on deferred prosecution re-offend, most receive probation. Although this probation increases detection of further re-offenses, the number of individuals on probation that start their trajectory with deferred prosecution is much less than the number initially sentenced to probation. The number of detected reoffenses is therefore small. As a result, the offense detection effect is overshadowed by the offense suppression effect of placing re-offenders that start their trajectory with probation (i.e., 100 individuals initially sentenced to it). This accounts for the drop in misdemeanors in the first and second years when probation substitutes for deferred prosecution. Conversely, when the offense suppression effect is removed as juveniles reach adulthood, mainly in the third year, there is an increase in felonies. With some variation in details, similar combinations of offense suppression and offense detection effects also explain differences in re-offense patterns for the other disposition pairs.
Unit Values for Justice System Costs and Benefits
Movements of individuals from shifts to more punitive sanction through subsequent re-offenses and re-dispositions are accompanied by streams of costs and benefits. The initial change in sentencing, which we imagine to apply to 100 juveniles for each disposition pair, incurs an initial incremental cost equal to the difference in average justice system costs between the harsher and milder sanction. Subsequent increases in re-dispositions then visit additional, marginal costs on the system, while declines provide marginal cost-saving benefits. In parallel, as we discuss in the next section, subsequent increases in re-offenses impose added costs on victims, their families, and various service providers (e.g., fire, ambulance, medical, etc.), while decreases offer loss-prevention gains.
Average, incremental, and marginal unit costs that we use to calculate net justice system benefits are summarized in Table 4 . To estimate total average costs we followed an activity-based costing procedure described in Wayson and Funke (1989) , adopting a few shortcuts due to time and resource limitations. The first step in this procedure traced the processes through which individuals move for each type of disposition. The next step identified all component activities that take place under each disposition, and all resources consumed in producing each activity: direct and indirect, labor and capital. In some instances, such as court processing, it was necessary to observe activities directly. For others, such as police overhead, we examined budget and expenditure reports in detail. As standard procedure, however, we relied on a combination of these approaches. That is, working from the specific to the general, we aggregated detailed activity data at the individual staff level to build a picture of the whole. At the same time, working from the general to the specific, we took line item expenditures and workload measures at the aggregate organizational level and broke them down to get figures for individual activities Though there are differences between cases that follow different disposition tracks, especially between deferred prosecution and the others, after police activities are done most go through a standard process that starts at intake assessment and ends at final disposition. Main differences between dispositions tend to involve ancillary activities that are part of one process but not another, such as matching the child with an appropriate placement facility. There are also variations in intensity or duration for the same activities, such as length of stay in detention pending court appearance, duration of supervision in the community, or time spent in out-of-home placement.
Another difference is type of court hearing, e.g., plea and disposition, trial before court, trial before jury, etc., but we found no systematic variation across dispositions on this score. Large cost differentials between dispositions result mainly from what happens after a disposition decision, i.e., short-term community supervision at one end versus long-term placement in an out-of-home treatment facility at the other. 2. Includes facility matching and case preparation for local placement. 3. Incremental cost is the additional cost of shifting to the harsher disposition, i.e., the difference in average costs. 4. Marginal cost is the cost associated with one additional re-disposition. 5. Includes police and court costs.
To arrive at final estimates for each activity and disposition, we multiplied the direct human resources cost by three indirect cost factors derived separately for departmental overhead (e.g., personnel benefits, support staffing, equipment and vehicle usage, etc.), overhead of the county's central administration, and capital (e.g., buildings, equipment, etc.).
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This calculation did not include the residential facility cost of TYC placement. Here we used figures from Fabelo (1999) and later updates from the Texas Criminal Justice Policy Council. Fabelo and the council also supplied averages for adult system costs: probation, $3,070; county jail, $840; state jail, $18,500; and prison followed by parole, $55,900 -to which we added our own estimates of adult arrest and related police costs ($560) and court costs ($2,000).
Incremental, or additional costs of shifting from milder to harsher sanction are then the differences in adjacent averages. For example, substituting TYC for local placement requires an incremental cost of $6,100 per juvenile (i.e., $35,750 minus $41,850). Averages are appropriate for establishing these incremental costs when we imagine disposition shifts that involve 100 juveniles at a time.
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For marginal costs (or benefits) associated with change in numbers of subsequent re-dispositions, values that are very hard to estimate accurately, we adopted a low-high estimate range: 10% and 25% of average costs. Because analysis results were almost the same when using 10% or 25%, we show marginal values in Table 4 at the center of the range, 17.5%, to simplify presentation. Marginal values for economic cost-benefit analysis, however, are not the same as for financial analysis. This is because Dallas County and the TYC use private contractors to perform many disposition-related activities.
In economic analysis, where the presumed point of view is the community as a whole seen through the lens of economic theory, the marginal cost to society of adding one or a few more juveniles to a public or private counseling service or to a public or private placement facility operating at less than full capacity is small. The fee that a private contractor charges to provide for the juvenile is usually based on the average cost of supplying the service, not the actual marginal cost. As consequence, economic cost-benefit analysis does not equate marginal values with the fee. Rather, marginal economic costs for the juvenile system in Table 4 are set equal to 17.5% of average costs.
In financial cost-benefit analysis the point of view is that of actors within society. In this perspective, an agency wanting to estimate how much more it would have to spend later on, or how much costsaving it might expect as a result of shifting juveniles to harsher disposition, must equate marginal cost with the contractor's fee, i.e., with average cost.
19 Because the 17.5% applies only to activities carried out internally while costs for contractor services within each disposition are set equal to their average values, marginal financial costs for the juvenile system are substantially higher than economic costs.
For the adult system, however, marginal economic and financial costs are both set at 17.5% of average costs because private contractor involvement, mainly for county jail, is modest. Given the small number of cases sent to county jail, application of a separate (and higher) estimate for the marginal financial cost of this sentence would have negligible impact on analysis results.
Unit Values for Costs and Benefits to Victims and Others
Re-offenses that precede re-dispositions engender tangible and intangible costs to victims, offenders, and others in the community, the prevention of which register as benefits . Miller et. al. (1996) provide a long list of such costs and benefits. However, we choose a narrower set of items that, in addition to being easier to monetize, are seen as especially important in the eyes of victims and most others: property losses from damage, theft, fraud, etc.; outlays for emergency responses by fire, ambulance, and police services; medical expenses to treat injuries; social services (mainly for child victims); mental health outlays to redress psychological harm; and foregone output due to death, injury, court appearances, or other events causing loss of time that might otherwise be engaged in paid or unpaid productive activity.
Also incorporated into some of our calculations are losses and gains in "quality of life" associated with pain and suffering of victims and their families (but not of offenders and their kin) stemming from death or injury. Inclusion of this intangible item in cost-benefit analysis is controversial, among other reasons because values for it are arbitrary (e.g., they range from $7,500 to more than $15 million per life) and because strategic selection of a particular value allows cost-benefit analysis to reach any conclusion. 20 We nevertheless include this item to see how it affects results in financial analysis.
The lower portion of Table 5 summarizes our schedule of estimated average economic and financial costs for each offense class under differing assumptions. The figures vary considerably. Total economic costs associated with a felony, for instance, range from $10,290 when assuming low values for services and output, to $19,940 when assuming high values. 21 Likewise, total financial costs stretch from $12,270 with low estimates for services and output to $22,370 with high estimates or, including "quality of life" at $34,550 per felony, $56,920. 4. Includes value of stolen itemsThe first of several steps to arrive at these values was dis-aggregation of the 58,650 juvenile and adult infractions in our sample into their constituent elements.
22 Second was to distinguish between offenses that incur victim and other non-justice system losses and those that do not. Relying on judgement of Juvenile Department staff, this exercise identified only one status or technical violation, intoxicated driving, that engendered losses. There were 53 such infractions during the reference period, or about 0.6 % of all violations. For misdemeanors, we estimated that 14,630 offenses, or 59 % of the total, incurred losses. The share for felonies was 86 %.
Third was to assign baseline dollar values for victim and other losses to each discrete charge that incurs them. Estimates of property loss from theft and/or material damage drew from several sources. For damage incurred during the course of infractions, such as household items broken during assaults, we used data from the 1996-97 National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS). For theft and vandalism we mainly relied on Dallas County offense records. These assign a dollar range for specific infractions, such as theft of more than $20 but less than $200. 23 Where records did not give values, in most instances of burglary and robbery for example, we again relied on NCVS data. Hall (1997) provided values for arson-related losses, Maguire and Pastore (1999) for burglary of vehicles, and Miller et. al. (1996) for remaining items.
Values for fire, ambulance, and police services not already included in disposition costs are based on analysis of detailed expenditure data for the City of Dallas. Police and fire department data are organized in a way that allows straightforward calculation of basic response costs (including or excluding transport to hospital), false alarms, and so on, and of a factor to account for central administrative overhead and capital . Miller et. al. (1996) is our source for baseline medical service costs, and for valuations of social and victim services, mental health services, and lost output and earnings. 24 We also use Miller et. al's value for "quality of life," i.e., $1.9 million for death, lesser sums for injuries.
In step four, after adjusting figures to year 2000 dollar terms, we derived weighted average values for each category of loss by offense class and sub-class, with variations for the different assumptions noted above. Table 5 summarizes the result, detailed in appendix Table A-3. These tables indicate that the average value of property loss and damage from a misdemeanor is $126 when stolen items are included, i.e., viewed from victims' financial perspective. When the items are excluded, i.e., viewed in the economic perspective as a transfer within society, the value is $32. For felonies, respective amounts are $2,795 and $365.
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The tables also show two values for social and victim services, mental health services, and lost output, one labeled "high" estimate and the other labeled "low". High values for social and victim, and mental health services are figures that we borrow from Miller et. al. (1996) . However, Miller et. al. seem to exaggerate the frequency at which victims avail themselves of these services. But we have no better estimates. Accordingly, to see how lower figures affect analysis, we take low estimates as 10% of the high ones. Likewise, the high value for lost output borrows from Miller et. al. Low estimates are half these values. We incorporate a low estimate here to account for the observation that victims of juvenile crime, by and large, have characteristics similar to those of offenders, notably lower than average earnings potential and shorter than average life expectancies.
Analysis Findings
Tables 6 through 9 present the results of our analysis. In different ways, they show the net benefit over four years -positive when benefits exceed costs and negative when costs exceed benefitsassociated with shifting 100 juveniles to the more restrictive sanction in each of the four disposition pairs.
26 Our first finding is that harsher sanctions do not produce positive net benefits for the justice system (Table 6 ). Whether looked at from an economic or from a financial perspective, cost-saving benefits, if any, from reduction in numbers of re-dispositions during the followup period are not sufficient to fully offset the initial incremental cost of tougher sentencing. From a financial perspective, county, state, municipal, and federal agencies expend a combined net of $801,000 (plus or minus $35,500) over four years when probation replaces deferred prosecution. Likewise, net midrange costs for intensive supervision instead of probation, local placement instead of intensive supervision, and TYC instead of local placement are, respectively, $486,000, $1,519,000, and $395,000. local placement rather than intensive supervision ($2,565,000) ($2,368,000) ± $53,500 ($1,519,000) ± $133,000
TYC rather than local placement ($610,000) ($548,000) ± $15,500 ($395,000) ± $40,500
Note: 1. Values in parentheses are negative net benefits, i.e., net costs.
Financial outlays even exceed initial incremental costs in the first two disposition pairs, probation instead of deferred prosecution and intensive supervision instead of probation. This is because these sentences, as we discussed in relation to Table 3 , are followed by increases in re-dispositions. The inverse applies to the other two pairs because they are followed by fewer re-dispositions. That is, although local placement instead of intensive supervision requires an initial incremental investment of $2,565,000, cost-saving benefits stemming from fewer re-dispositions (i.e., $1,046,000 at the midrange), lower the aggregate financial burden to $1,519,000. Similarly, cost-saving benefits of TYC instead of local placement reduce net fiscal outlays from $610,000 at the start to $395,000 at the end of four years.
Our second finding is that tougher sanction does not always produce positive net benefits for victims and others and, when it does, gains are substantial only after including a value for "quality of life." (Table 7) . Specifically, probation in lieu of deferred prosecution, rather than reducing them, increases costs to victims and others. The reason, noted in our earlier discussion of re-offenses (see Table 2 ), is that this shift, though it suppresses misdemeanors during the first two years, is followed in the third year by increased numbers of felonies imposing high victim costs that wipe out prior gains. The result is a net (mid-range) loss over the period of $76,580, or $188,600 with "quality of life." This is a "lose-lose"outcome, with public agencies and victims both bearing higher costs. Less perverse, intensive supervision in lieu of regular probation yields no victim benefits warranting mention because this action produces only increases in technical violations and status offenses, infractions with negligible impact. Although the justice system bears a higher cost, the benefit to victims and others is effectively zero. In contrast, local placement instead of intensive supervision generates positive net benefits of $66,600 at the mid-range, or $171,800 with "quality of life." Here, big gains associated with firstyear declines in misdemeanors are cut back somewhat by large increases in numbers of misdemeanors and felonies in subsequent years. Also, because the probability range for our estimate of total re-offenses is quite wide -running from -17.9 to +14.1 misdemeanors and from -20.2 to 17.7 felonies (see Table 2 ) -the range for victim net benefits is also wide: ±$114,000, or ±$354,000 with "quality of life." These figures, bigger than their respective mid-range values (i.e., $66,600 and $171,800), imply that this disposition shift also carries with it a chance of producing negative net benefits for victims and others. So the only disposition substitution that produces unambiguous positive net benefits for victims and others is TYC for local placement, with net gains at the midrange value of $88,800, or $235,300 with "quality of life."
Combining justice system and victim net benefits, our third finding is that total net benefits are negative for all disposition pairs (Table 8) . Whether viewed from an economic or financial perspective, the total dollar value of benefits from reduced numbers of re-dispositions and reoffenses, even when adopting a high estimate for services and output and incorporating "quality of life," is unlikely to come close to the total dollar value of costs. The possible exception, seen from a financial perspective that incorporates $1.9 million as the value of human life, is TYC in lieu of local placement. The estimated probability range here is a negative net benefit lying between -$318,000 and -$8,000 (i.e., -$163,000 ±$155,000). The upper bound of the range is still a net cost of $8,000, or $80 per juvenile, but it is close enough to the break-even point to imply that benefits have a chance of equaling or exceeding costs when the number of serious offenses and associated redispositions prevented is large in relation to the incremental investment needed to produce these effects. Only substitution of TYC for local placement exhibits this capacity in our model, and only when "quality of life" is assigned a value in excess of $1.9 million. However, if one rejects the premise, as does the economic perspective, that gains or losses in "quality of life" are benefits or costs to society, or if one views the putting of a dollar value on life as lacking analytic meaning or utility (e.g., because it is so arbitrary), then substitution of TYC for local placement looks no better in cost-benefit terms than the other disposition pairs. high value for services and output plus "quality of life" Economic Net Benefit probation rather than deferred prosecution ($691,000) ± $29,500 ($726,000) ± $50,500 not applicable intensive supervision rather than probation ($346,000) ± $16,000 ($346,000) ± $16,000 not applicable local placement rather than intensive supervision ($2,337,000) ± $110,000 ($2,308,000) ± $178,500 not applicable TYC rather than local placement ($509,000) ± $31,500 ($473,000) ± $53,000 not applicable Financial Net Benefit probation rather than deferred prosecution ($845,000) ± $47,500 ($879,000) ± $65,000 ($994.000) ± $140,500
intensive supervision rather than probation ($486,000) ± $72,500 ($486,000) ± $72,500 ($486,000) ± $72,500
These findings are highly sensitive, among lots of other things, to our choice of non-system cost and benefit items to include in analysis, and to our dollar valuations of them. We've not examined gains and losses to offenders and their families, nor the value of retribution (i.e., punishment for its own sake), nor other items. It is often impossible to quantify such things or to derive reasonable dollar estimates for them. Had we used $7,500 as the value of a human life rather than $1.9 million, our findings would remain intact. Adoption of $15 million might change everything.
It is helpful in this context to also examine the situation's cost-effectiveness, i.e., net justice system dollars required to avoid one delinquency, and leave decision makers and others free to judge whether the outlay is worth what it yields. Our finding here, consistent with the previous, is that except for TYC in lieu of local placement, harsher sanction is a fairly expensive way to prevent serious offenses ( Table 9 ). Substitution of probation for deferred prosecution, for instance, leads to a mid-range decrease of 9.0 misdemeanors, an increase of 3.9 felonies, and thus a net reduction of 5.1 delinquencies over the followup period. This means that the justice system expends between $150,000 and $164,000 (i.e.,-$157,000 ± $7,000) in financial terms to prevent one delinquency. At the very least, this outlay is superior to that of intensive supervision in lieu of probation, where a mid-range cost of $486,000 produces no delinquency reductions (because this shift only affects technical offenses and status violations). It is also superior to local placement in lieu of intensive supervision which, as a result of being unable to match high incremental expenditure with high prevention, reduces serious offenses at a net financial cost of $380,000 per occurrence. In contrast, and precisely because the incremental system cost of making the shift is small while the delinquency prevention effect, 17.9 serious offenses, is large, TYC instead of local placement reduces these infractions at a net cost of $22,000 per occurrence.
These indicators suggest that decision makers and others who favor harsher sanction to protect society from serious offenses or simply to punish bad behavior place a high implicit value on delinquent acts and/or their effects. If they prefer probation to deferred prosecution, for example, then they imply that they believe the cost to the community of one delinquency has a mid-range value of at least $157,000. If worth less, then beyond serving as means to augment constituency support in the political arena, there is no obvious purpose in their willingness to spend that many tax dollars to prevent it. Likewise, a delinquency must be perceived to cost the community at least $380,000 if the way to avoid it is by substituting local placement for intensive supervision, $22,000 if TYC is preferred to local placement.
Conclusion
Our findings, only as accurate and as useful as our data and methods allow, are specific to Dallas County. They cannot be readily generalized to jurisdictions with very different justice policy regimes, system cost structures, demographic characteristics, and economic milieus. Notwithstanding this caution, we are confident in suggesting that communities which pursue policies of more restrictive sanction, if curious about relationships between costs and benefits, are likely to discover that material gains to victims and others, though perhaps substantial, do not make up for the added spending needed to produce the gains.
Even if these policies reduce offenses, including serious ones, the composition of infractions that fall under the rubric of delinquency is such that the average value of prevented losses to victims and others is modest. At the outside, we reckon it to be about $57,000 per felony. At the same time, the instrument used to obtain this benefit is extraordinarily blunt, our model suggesting, for example, that it requires local placement of 100 juveniles to generate a net mid-range reduction of two felonies over four years. The arithmetic is then unambiguous: a $2,565,000 incremental investment in incarceration prevents two felonies that, had they happened, would have cost victims and others $114,000.
Though it may point out that this relationship represents an "inefficient" use of resources, costbenefit analysis does not and cannot say that spending $2,565,000 to get a return of $114,000 is "bad." The procedure is not certain enough, not complete enough, to provide such a definitive assertion. In addition to costs and benefits to offenders, the value of retribution, and other things, we've not accounted for the political pros and cons of advocating harsher sanction. Dollars are important. But in the political arena of decision making, where judges and other key actors are elected, so too are votes, building of constituencies, and the like. In this arena decision makers may have sound reason to act, or at least to appear to act tough.
Nevertheless, our cost-benefit analysis suggests that while there may be tangible and ethereal gains, say, from actions that prevent two offenses, these actions impose substantial opportunity costs because equal or greater tangible gains also flow from not preventing them and allowing victims and others to suffer the consequences. Not spending $2,565,000 on incarceration is $2,565,000 that can be expended on valued public goods and services within the justice system and outside, or returned to taxpayers. This sum is consequential for a jurisdiction with two million people, as $360 million would be for the entire country if the county figure is extrapolated to it. So if real or imagined political necessity seems to insist upon getting tough, cost-benefit analysis informs decision makers, voters, scholars, and any others who are of mind to listen that this policy exacts a heavy communal cost. More generally, it reminds that retribution, rehabilitation, incapacitation, deterrence, restoration, compensation, and other goals are achieved at a price. Justice policy, accordingly, is ill-served when the list of goals ignores or downplays the import of maximizing benefits and minimizing costs for the whole community. 
The 1995 Texas code requires local juvenile justice boards to adopt a seven-step policy of progressive sanctions. Each step defines sanction options available to judges and probation officials for different classifications of delinquents. These classifications are based on type of offense; past criminal or delinquent behavior; effectiveness of previous interventions; and an assessment of special treatment, counseling, or training needs. Boards may deviate from these guidelines when they deem other actions more appropriate. All boards exercise this option, most using it for the bulk of cases.
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Five studies compare diversion to regular juvenile court processing, i.e., Davidson and Redner (1988), Dunford et. al. (1982) , National Council on Crime and Delinquency (1987), Quay and Love (1977) , and Severy and Whitaker (1982) . Five compare intensive supervision probation to regular probation, i.e., Elrod and Minor (1992) , Empey and Erickson (1972) , Fagan and Reinarman (1991), Land et. al. (1992) , and National Council on Crime and Delinquency (1987) . Two compare intensive supervision probation to incarceration, i.e., Barton and Butts (1990) and Lerman (1975) . 3 Noteworthy applications of cost-benefit analysis include Greenwood et. al. (1996a) and Karoly et. al. (1998) , who look at longer-term impacts of early childhood intervention programs on delinquency, and Lipsey (1984) , who looks at delinquency prevention. Hser and Anglin (1991) and Hubbard and French (1991) examine drug treatment, while Colgan (1998), Gray et. al. (1978) , Rasmussen and Yu (1996) , and Roberts and Cammasso (1991) explore sentencing options. In the most exhaustive use, Aos et. al. (2001) apply the method to fourteen juvenile programs, including: multi-systemic and functional family therapy; aggression replacement training; multidimensional treatment foster care; diversion; intensive supervision probation/parole; sex offender treatment; and boot camps. The position of these advocates stirs opposition which, at the other extreme, rejects all possibility of the method serving constructive purpose (see Frank, 2000) . Because it implies rejection of the utility of weighing pros and cons, a characteristic human behavior, such extreme opposition is a bit "over the top." 5 Aos et. al. (2001) , for example, rely on findings from what they consider rigorous evaluations in different states to estimate effects for Washington state. Because the evaluations involve small samples and short followup periods, e.g., less than 260 individuals and two years in diversion studies from Michigan, Aos et. al. use Washington recidivism data to extend the analytical time horizon to seven years. Though the work comes closer to reality than most, it remains an analysis of hypothetical scenarios. This is the unavoidable consequence of data scarcity. The literature reports estimated costs for juvenile probation (in $2000 terms) that range from $2.20 per day in Bourque et. al. (1996 ) to $5.90 in Aos et. al. (2001 . Residential placement estimates run from $33 in Roberts and Camasso (1991) to $115 in Fabelo (1999) . More extreme are values for human life. These range from $7,500 per life in Acton (1973) and Levitt and Venkatesh (1998) to more than $15 million in Jones-Lee (1976) and Lanoie et. al. (1995). 7 Economic cost-benefit analysis, among other strictures imposed by adherence to theory, insists that costs and benefits incurred and received by all affected societal actors be counted. Thus material and psychological losses resulting from theft are balanced by material and psychological gains to the wrongdoer and others who may benefit from use of the stolen items. If net gains to victims. This may explain why few of the cost-benefit studies noted earlier, even those by economists, are of this type. They are "financial" analyses, adopting perspectives that are mainly shaped by personal, cultural, occupational, political, bureaucratic, and other considerations. 8 The two informal dispositions are "supervisory caution," where a child is counseled and then released, and "deferred prosecution," where the child is sent home with a warning to stay out of trouble. The mildest formal disposition is "probation," under which a probation officer visits the child once every month or two for a period set by the court, usually a year. Next is "intensive supervision probation," involving more frequent, weekly monitoring of behavior for an initial period of six months followed, if the child does not re-offend, by six months of regular probation. Third is local "placement" in a residential facility operated directly by the county or by a private contractor. This incarceration can be in a secure facility from which getting away is hard or an open facility from which leaving is easy. Placement averages 270 days, followed by 70 days of counseling, education, and other aftercare services. Fourth is placement in a secure state facility, operated directly by the TYC or for it by private contractors, also for an average of 270 days, followed by 90 days of parole. Last is determinant sentencing, the most severe juvenile disposition. There is also a very rare disposition: transfer to the adult criminal court system.
9
Juveniles sentenced to TYC placement during 1994-99, for example, had a mean of 2.4 years of prior contact with the justice system, during which they accumulated an average of 7.3 offenses, largely felonies, for assaults and property crimes. Those given deferred prosecution had a mean of 0.5 years of contact and an accumulation of 1.47 offenses, mainly misdemeanors. 10 We compare effects between adjacent rather than distant dispositions for two reasons. First, juvenile characteristics are similar between proximate dispositions. It is hard to predict what would happen if placement substitutes for deferred prosecution because children receiving such dispositions are very different from each other, especially with respect to their offense histories and probable reoffense and re-adjudication trajectories. Of those who got deferred prosecution during 1994-97, for example, 18% were re-adjudicated during the following 48 months, and a bit more than 7% were placed. But among juveniles who received local placement, more than half were re-adjudicated and 41% were placed again. Differences are much smaller between neighboring dispositions. The second reason is that courts exercise decisions on the margin between dispositions. Judges do not choose harsher treatment unless milder ones prove ineffective. To be useful, analysis should compare realistic alternatives.
11
These data come from three sources. First is the Dallas County Juvenile Department's database on offenders arrested and referred between the ages of 10 and 17 years. It supplies all information on re-offenses and re-dispositions while individuals are under jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Second is the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS), providing data on arrests after individuals reach adulthood. Third, necessary because DPS records don't give reliable information on adult dispositions, is the county's criminal court database. Here we drew a random sub-sample of 1,774 cases from the juvenile pool who received probation, intensive supervision, local and TYC placement during 1994-96. Most reached adulthood by 1999. After matching them with DPS offense records, we extracted from court data the associated dispositions and length of sentence.
12 By "initial" we mean that each observation represents the first instance that a juvenile statistical models, such as ordinary least squares regression, which assume a continuous distribution for the endogenous variable (Johnson et. al., 1992; Cameron and Trivedi, 1986) . A common discrete distribution is the Poisson count (Hausman et. al., 1984; Bartko, 1961; Greenwood and Yule, 1920) . But this model is limited by its distribution assumptions, which lead to biased as well as inefficient estimates when applied to "over-dispersed" data, i.e., where the dependent variable has a variance that exceeds its expected value (Land, et. al.,1996; Johnson, et. al, 1992; Winkelmann et. al.,1995) . The negative binomial regression model, commonly used to address over-dispersed data, allows for a less restrictive variance and, as a result, yields less biased estimates (Baron, 1992; Gardner, et. al, 1995) . 14 We specify two sets of dependent variable in our equations. For differences in re-offenses, dependent variables are number of technical violations and status offenses, number of misdemeanors, and number of felonies committed during each year. For re-dispositions that result from the offenses, the dependent variable is total number of re-dispositions each year. Applying the negative binomial regression procedure, we model expected number of re-offenses and re-dispositions (y i ), with covariates x i, as:
Here, e µi represents the unknown heterogeneity across observations. It follows a gamma distribution with mean of 1 and variance α.. The set of co-variates x i in the models include the basic demographic and offense history variables shown in appendix Table A-1.
By controlling statistically for the influence of other variables presumed to affect rates of re-offense and re-disposition, the model allows some isolation of the effect of sentencing. At the same time, model coefficients, or parameters, allow generation of re-offense and re-disposition predictions for different cohorts. That is, for re-offenses, the model simulates what a typical individual's re-offense count would be if he or she received the harsher disposition. For re-dispositions, it simulates the probability of being re-adjudicated for additional offenses of one type or another under different initial dispositions.
With this statistical procedure, we generate predictions of differences in numbers of re-offenses between disposition pairs through manipulation of "dummy" variables that represent each disposition cohort. For example, in simulating probation versus deferred prosecution, the model specification is:
Here, D i is the dummy variable for type of disposition, set to 1 if the child received probation or to 0 if the child received deferred prosecution. Other independent control variables are represented by x i . The coefficient for the dummy variable, β 2i , is estimated from a pooled sample, i.e., containing individuals in both deferred prosecution and probation cohorts. This coefficient represents the estimated difference in number of re-offenses for the probation cohort relative to the deferred prosecution cohort. Given the parameter estimates for x and D, and the fact that D is set to 0 for deferred prosecution, the predicted number of "actual" re-offenses for individuals who received deferred prosecution is then: deferred prosecution cases with the same offender characteristics. These new re-offense predictions, however, are what the model predicts would result from changing the disposition from deferred prosecution to probation. The difference between the two predictions, one based on the actual disposition dummy value (i.e., D = 0) and the other on the modified dummy value (i.e., D = 1) while holding other offender characteristics constant (i.e., as represented by x i ), yields the predicted difference in number of re-offenses that our simulation model says would result from shifting to the harsher sentence.
15 Table 2 shows only the statistically significant results. The model predicts differences for every disposition pair, but many of them are not significant at a 95% probability level, i.e., where the probability that an observed difference stems from chance is more than 5% or, conversely, where the probability that the difference is not zero is less than 95%. The determining factor is the statistical significance of the disposition dummy variable. 16 We used a procedure similar to that for offenses, with two modifications. One is that there is no manipulation of disposition dummy variables. Instead, we derive them from estimated coefficients of re-offense variables in the re-disposition models. That is, rather than using actual numbers of redispositions for re-offenders, we apply statistical models to generate expected numbers of for a given number of predicted re-offenses. We do this because, given that the first step in our procedure is simulation of differences in numbers of re-offenses, subsequent steps involving re-dispositions must maintain the same underlying assumptions. Thus in our re-disposition model we try to account for relationships that are likely to exist between a juvenile's initial disposition, his or her offense and other characteristics, re-offense pattern, and the probability of being re-adjudicated in each year of the followup period. Setting number of re-dispositions as the dependent variable and re-offense counts and other characteristics as independent variables, we estimate coefficients for re-offenses. These represent the estimated number of re-dispositions for each re-offense, which we use to generate re-disposition predictions for each cohort. In the second modification, whereas re-offense prediction models involve separate estimates for each of three offense classes for every year of followup, we estimate type of re-disposition by applying the county's actual disposition distribution pattern to total re-disposition counts.
17
Overhead includes salary and wage benefits, salaries and benefits of support and supervisory staff, supplies, and materials. Central administration overhead represents the proportion of supporting activities provided by other county agencies that contribute to the operation of direct units. Major items here are building maintenance and utilities, central administrative personnel, and budget control and management. For capital equipment and facilities, our analysis of county and police expenditures indicated that depreciation of structures over forty years, and vehicles and equipment over three years, yields an annualized expenditure equal to less than 3% of annual operating budgets. To be safe, we adopted a 5% cost factor for these items.
18
Dallas County averages 1,780 deferred prosecution cases per year, 1,280 probation, 330 intensive supervision, 580 local placement, and 310 TYC placement. With the spirit of realism that directed us to compare adjacent rather than distant dispositions also telling us to take a realistic view of the magnitude of feasible shifts between dispositions in any one period, we think that a scale of 100 juveniles is reasonable. It is small relative to the frequency of deferred prosecution and probation community services are provided by contractors. Departmental policy, logically, is to first fill its own facilities and services and, in the opposite direction, to first drain contractor facilities and services. On the margin, therefore, movement of juveniles into or out of placement, and into or out of community services associated with this and other dispositions, are shifts toward and away from contractors. The situation is the same for TYC placement. In both instances the marginal cost of services and of placement (i.e., excluding disposition-related activities done in house) is equal to the contractor fee.
20
Several methods are used to derive estimates for the value of human life and, less often, of physical and mental anguish associated with injury. Common among them is the "revealed preference" approach, which assumes that individuals, implicitly or explicitly by the choices they make in the market, express their beliefs as to what their own lives are worth. Also common is the "contingent valuation," or survey approach, which presumes that one can arrive at a value for life by asking people what they think it is rather than trying to deduce it from their market behavior. Less common is the "jury award" method, used by Miller et. al. (1996) , which presumes that juries are representative samples of the communities from which they are drawn, and that the awards they make represent the values that these communities attach to the pain and suffering involved in different kinds of cases. This method is rarer than the others, among other reasons because with published jury awards that reach beyond $200,000,000 per case, most analysts share Zimring and Hawkins ' (1995) view that it yields estimates that "...are opportunistic, arbitrary, inconsistent, and too high" (p. 138).
21
Values in Table 5 would be somewhat lower with use of marginal rather than average costs for applicable items, i.e., police, medical, social, and mental health services. However, when values range by multiples of more than five for misdemeanors to more than seven for felonies, this adjustment would make only negligible difference in results. That is why we do not use marginal pricing here.
22
The 58,650 infractions comprise: 9,710 status violations distributed across 15 discrete charges; 24,790 misdemeanors distributed across 12 sub-classes and 134 charges; and 24,150 felonies distributed across 11 sub-classes and 178 discrete charges. Sub-class refers to general subcategories of each offense class. For example, misdemeanor sub-classes include: assault with injury, assault with no injury, criminal mischief and other damage, possession or delivery of drugs or other illegal items, etc. Discrete charge refers to specific offenses within each sub-class. Under criminal mischief and other damage, for instance, charges include: criminal mischief valued at less than $20, criminal mischief valued at between $30 and $50, reckless damage or destruction, desecration of a venerated object, failure to give notice upon striking an unattended vehicle, graffiti, etc.
23
To pinpoint a value to represent each range, we used 85% of the mid-point of the bracketderiving this proportion from analysis of relationships between means and mid-points for comparable ranges in the NCVS. The tables are based on application of system unit costs to predicted differences in numbers of re-dispositions, and unit costs for victims and others to differences in numbers of re-offenses. Given the range of uncertainty in our predictions of re-offenses and re-dispositions, there is necessarily a corresponding range of uncertainty for estimates of net benefit. At the same time, there is variation in the assumptions that underlie our dollar value estimates (i.e., economic versus financial perspective, high estimate for services and output versus low, inclusion versus exclusion of "quality of life"). This means that there is a specific range of probable values for the net benefit for each combination of assumptions. To address uncertainty, we adopted a Monte Carlo simulation procedure to generate probable ranges for net benefits under each set of assumptions. The procedure randomly sampled predicted differences in re-offenses and re-dispositions from their respective 95% probability distributions, i.e., between their lower and upper bounds. Every run of the simulation selected one re-offense and one re-disposition figure for each disposition pair and year of followup. At the same time, it multiplied each figure by the relevant unit cost for the system and for each of five sets of assumptions about unit costs to victims and others (i.e., two economic net benefits, one assuming a low and the other a high estimate of service and output costs; and three financial net benefits, one assuming a low estimate of service and output costs, the second a high estimate, and the third the same high estimate plus a value for "quality of life"), all discounted at an annual rate of 5% to bring them to year 2000, "present value" terms. Summed over four years, the procedure yielded one net benefit estimate for the justice system and, after adding victim and other losses and gains, two total economic net benefit estimates and three total financial net benefit estimates. Repetition of this procedure 1000 times for every disposition pair produced 1000 estimates for each of the six net benefits, distributed as 95% probability distributions between lower and upper bounds on each side of a mid-range dollar value.
